Taking Stock by Hale, Brenda
111
Taking Stock1
Brenda Hale2
Many congratulations to Cardiff Law School and the Approved Mental Health Professionals Association
(North West and North Wales) for organising this timely conference. I am looking forward to learning a
lot from the galaxy of mental health law practitioners and scholars here today. It is a special pleasure to
be back in Manchester, where I spent 18 years of my professional life and first encountered mental health
and the law.
We shall be reflecting on the experience of the three recent upheavals in mental health and mental
capacity law – the Mental Capacity Act 2005, most of which came into force on 1 October 2007,
accompanied by a Code of Practice; the Mental Health Act 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act
1983, most of which came into force on 3 November 2008, accompanied by its two Codes of Practice;
and the Mental Health Act 2007 amendments to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, bringing in the so-called
deprivation of liberty safeguards or DOLS, on 1 April this year, together with another Code of Practice.
That is a huge amount of new law for us all to get to grips with. Things have changed a great deal since
I first started teaching Mental Health Law to social workers and psychiatrists in this very City in 1971 –
nearly 40 years ago.
There was no such thing as mental health law then. The Mental Health Act 1959 had only been in force
for ten years. The only law books were large practitioners’ tomes (Shaw’s Mental Health Services3 and
Heywood and Massey’s Court of Protection Practice4). For many mental health professionals, including
Kathleen Jones, whose History of the Mental Health Services5 (1972, bringing together Lunacy, Law and
Conscience 1744–1845 and Mental Health and Social Policy 1845–1958) was the main academic text of the
time, “legalism” was a dirty word. The 1959 Act was hailed as the death of mental health law. The Court
of Protection might be necessary to look after the property and affairs of people who were rich enough to
make it worthwhile but whose families were not smart enough to devise ways of avoiding its attentions.
But everything else could be handled by a presumption of informality. 
What lawyers might call safeguards, mental health professionals called formalities. The formal procedures
were operated largely by the professionals and only used when the patient’s resistance made it necessary
to do so. The social workers I taught were deeply uncomfortable with the contradictions between their
therapeutic role, based for many of them on psychotherapeutic principles of client responsibility and
autonomy, and their power to take that autonomy away. The result was a playing down of the importance
of legal safeguards. The law said nothing about what treatment might be given to incapacitated or
detained patients in hospital because it was assumed that they could be given whatever treatment their
doctors thought best for them. 
1 This is the text (with added footnotes) of the keynote
address delivered by the author at ‘Taking Stock: The
Mental Health & Mental Capacity reforms: the first year’,
a conference organised by the Approved Mental Health
Professionals Association (North West and North Wales)
and Cardiff Law School in Manchester on 9th October
2009.
2 Baroness Hale of Richmond; Justice of the Supreme Court.
3 Now out of print. However, Shaw & Sons Ltd intend to
publish in due course its successor ‘Gostin on Mental
Health Law’ (publication date not known).
4 Heywood and Massey: Court of Protection Practice is now
in its 13th edition (2009) (Sweet & Maxwell).
5 Published by Routlege & Kegan Paul (1972)
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A parallel system of court orders was provided for mentally disordered offenders. In theory, they could be
neatly pigeon holed into the ‘bad’ – who should be punished in proportion to the seriousness of their
crimes – and the ‘mad’ who could be kept in hospital until they were cured. But in practice, there was a
category of restricted patients who could be kept in hospital for as long as the Home Secretary thought
that they might be a danger to the public. For those who could not be cured this meant that they might
remain in hospital for a very long time.
The lawyers were hardly involved at all. There was virtually no case law about the 1959 Act in the 1960s.
(So it is not surprising that the first edition of my little book6, published in 1976, was able to cover the
whole of the law in England and Wales, with a supplement on Scottish law, in around 75,000 words and
236 pages.) The underlying policy assumptions were that the NHS could be trusted to look after the
health and local authorities to look after the social care of people with mental disorders and disabilities,
in much the same way as they looked after people with physical disorders and disabilities. Warehousing
patients in large institutions in the countryside was to be phased out. 
It is easy to forget what a radical change the 1959 Act had been from the previous approach of both the
law and the pubic services. Much of it we now take for granted: the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of People with Disabilities, adopted in 2006 and coming into force in 2008 (ratified by the United
Kingdom in 2009) uses the conventional language of “mainstreaming”. 
But things were changing in the 1970s. Larry Gostin, now at Georgetown University in Washington,
brought an American civil rights lawyer’s eye to our system and found it deeply wanting (MIND, 
A Human Condition, 1975 and 19777). The Butler Committee on Mentally Disordered Offenders (1975)
was sceptical about the pigeon holes. The public remained scared of mentally disordered offenders. Mr X,
conditionally discharged from Broadmoor for some years, was summarily returned to hospital because of
what his estranged wife told his probation officer. He could do nothing at all to challenge the reasons for
his detention before a court which could let him out. The European Court of Human Rights held the
United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under article 5 of the ECHR (X v United Kingdom (1982) 
4 EHRR 188, an application made in 1975 and decided in 1981). Human rights were very firmly on the
scene.
The result was the Mental Health Act 1983. This left the basic structure intact. But it gave a greatly
expanded and enhanced role to mental health review tribunals. It also placed some restrictions on the
compulsory treatment of detained patients. Perhaps above all, it created the Mental Health Act
Commission. Can we pay tribute to the work of the Mental Health Act Commission8 and regret its
passing? I hope that the Care Quality Commission will be able to keep up their good and very necessary
work on behalf of detained patients, which could all too easily be obscured by the more everyday concerns
of a body which has the whole of health and social care to regulate and worry about.
After the 1983 Act, there was a great deal more law for the professionals to know (so the second edition
of my little book, published in 1984, had grown to 346 pages and had to drop its Appendix on Scotland).
Academic lawyers, most notably Phil Fennell9, were now taking an interest and engaging in serious
research. But there was still not a lot of case law and only a few practising lawyers were involved. 
6 Mental Health Law by Brenda Hoggett (Sweet &
Maxwell) – now in its 4th edition (1996): The 5th edition
is due to be published in June 2010.
7 Now out of print.
8 See a review of the MHAC’s 13th Biennial Report in this
issue of the Journal of Mental Health Law.
9 Now Professor of Law, Cardiff Law School, Cardiff
University. Author of ‘Mental Health: The New Law’
(Jordans) (2007), reviewed in the Journal of Mental
Health Law May 2008.
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Richard Jones’ invaluable Mental Health Act Manual did not begin publication until 1985, but has sped to
12 editions10 in less than quarter of a century. 
But soon the legal practitioners did begin to take an interest. I assume that this was because legal aid
(technically only assistance by way of representation) had become available before MHRTs. Their
enhanced powers over restricted patients meant that heavy weight judges had been drafted in to preside
over what became increasingly like ordinary trials. Lawyers began to specialise and the olden days when
the tribunal and the mental health professionals knew far more about the law than the lawyers did were
left behind. Lawyers also began to bring judicial review proceedings in the High Court. The case law began
to develop, though only quite slowly to begin with. So my third edition in 1990 grew only to 369 pages. 
By then there was a new concern. Many more people with serious mental disabilities were living in the
community and living longer. Their families and carers were very concerned that there seemed to be no
legal framework for looking after them. Here again, the assumption was that informality was best. I do
not at all question this assumption, but there were no clear principles governing what could be done and
no obvious procedures for resolving doubts and difficulties. Behind closed doors, the Family Division of
the High Court began granting declarations authorising controversial procedures. In a blaze of publicity
in 1989, the House of Lords endorsed this: Re F (Mental Patient) (Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. The Law
Society (in the shape of Penny Letts)11 and the Law Commission (in the shape of Brenda Hoggett, as I
then was) began to take an interest in reforming the law. 
The nineties and noughties saw a massive expansion in activity on three fronts. The Law Commission
produced their Report on Mental Incapacity in 1995 (Law Com No 231). The Government consulted and
produced draft Bills for pre-legislative scrutiny. Eventually, 10 years after the Law Commission’s Report,
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 hit the statute books, doing more or less what the Commission had
proposed. It was kind of Paul Bowen to call it “an elegant piece of legislative architecture” (Blackstone’s
Guide to the Mental Health Act 200712, 2007, p ix). 
But when the Act was passed it was already known to be incomplete. This was the result of the rapidly
growing case law, even before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. One product of that, as
everyone knows, was the Bournewood case (R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, 
ex p L [1999] AC 458). The Court of Appeal, as everyone knows, held that Richard Jones and I were
wrong to think that the 1983 Act authorised informal admission and treatment of people who lacked the
capacity to decide for themselves to accept treatment. They had not been referred to the legislative
history, or to the policy underlying the 1959 Act, or to the case law on necessity, including Re F. 
The House of Lords rescued the situation in 1998, but many thought that the absence of safeguards to
protect people who were informally deprived of their liberty in this way was indeed a gap. The facts did
not help, as L would clearly have objected to his admission to hospital had he not been sedated in order
to get him there. In 2004, the European Court of Human Rights held, in HL v United Kingdom (2004) 
40 EHRR 761, that the risk of arbitrary and unjustified deprivation of liberty without access to a tribunal
meant that there was a breach of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Something had
to be done. But the Government could not decide what to do before the Mental Capacity Bill was passed,
10 Mental Health Act Manual by Richard Jones (Sweet & Maxwell) (12th edition) (2009). See ‘Some Recent Publications’ by
John Horne in this issue of the Journal of Mental Law.
11 Now an independent Policy Consultant; then Law Society Policy Advisor and Secretary to the Law Society Mental Health and
Disability Committee.
12 Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Health Act 2007 by Paul Bowen (Oxford University Press) (2007), reviewed in the Journal
of Mental Health May 2008.
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just before Parliament was dissolved in time for the election in May 2005. Countless breaches of article 5
must have taken place up and down the country while the Government pondered the dilemma. I am not
aware that anyone has taken action under the Human Rights Act as a result, but perhaps someone here
will know. Five years after HL we now have the answer in the DOLS. 
As Paul Bowen13 comments, these are a “decidedly inelegant” addition to the 2005 Act, nearly doubling
it in size. I am not sure that I would call it “the new triumph of legalism” because legalism referred to the
involvement of lawyers and magistrates in committal procedures, whereas these procedures are, as he
points out “labyrinthine and bureaucratic”. I am not sure which is worse. 
The Government thinks that there are roughly 500,000 people in England and Wales who have a mental
disorder and lack capacity living in institutions (including over 190,000 with severe learning difficulties
and about 230,000 older people with dementia). Department of Health analysts concluded that around
10% of these would require additional restrictions for their own protection which might involve
deprivation of liberty. For some reason they then predicted that there will be 21,000 assessments in
2009/2010, of which only 25% would lead to authorisation. They also predicted that assessments will
rapidly decline to 6,600 in 2015/16 but a similar proportion will result in authorisations. This is because
they think that care homes and hospitals will become skilled at avoiding deprivations of liberty. 
An alternative hypothesis is that they will become skilled at avoiding using these procedures, just as most
people managed to avoid troubling the Court of Protection even though they should have done. 
The Ministry of Justice thinks that only 2.5% of authorisations will result in a Court of Protection hearing.
We shall see, but current experience suggests that they have over- rather than under-estimated the
numbers. The worry remains that people who are in fact being deprived of their liberty are also being
deprived of the safeguards to which they are entitled. 
Meanwhile, in another part of the forest, the Government was reviewing the Mental Health Act. 
As always, deeply contradictory forces were at work. On the one hand were the mental health
professionals who wanted the law to reflect the realities of modern mental health care, including multi-
disciplinary teamwork and treatment in the community. But there was now much a better understanding
between the professionals and the lawyers. Jill Peay’s study of “Decisions and Dilemmas” (2003)14 showed
that the professionals were much more respectful of their patients’ autonomy and conscious of their legal
rights than they had been when I was sitting on Mental Health Review Tribunals in the early 1980s. 
The dilemma as always was how to reconcile that consciousness with their perception of their patients’
needs. The lawyers too were beginning to realise that the goal was not always to keep the patient out of
hospital at all costs but often how to achieve the care and treatment which the patient really needed.
Together they could make common cause. It was that collaboration which produced the 1999 Report of
the Expert Committee15, led by Genevra Richardson. This tried to reflect the realities of modern practice
while providing rational and defensible grounds for interfering in autonomy and proper procedural
safeguards for doing so. 
On the other hand the Government, with a great deal of public support, was increasingly concerned with
protecting the public from offenders deemed especially dangerous. This meant detaining them long after
the proportionate “tariff” for the crimes they had committed had expired and until they could show that
13 Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers. See n.12.
14 ‘Decisions and Dilemmas: working with Mental Health Law’ by Jill Peay (Hart Publishing) (2003), reviewed in the Journal of
Mental Health Law February 2004.
15 The report of the Expert Committee ‘Review of the Mental Health Act 1983’ was published by the Department of Health in
November 1999.
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they were “safe”. This concern was first reflected in the “hybrid” orders brought in by the Crime
(Sentences) Act 1997 but we also see it in the indefinite sentence for public protection. The view that a
restriction order was no longer an answer must have increased when the first declaration of
incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998 held that it was for the hospital to show that the
grounds for detention still existed and not for the patient to show that they did not (R (H) v Mental Health
Review Tribunal [2002] QB 1). 
The battle between these two points of view continued for nearly a decade until the Mental Health Act
2007. After the expert report, there was a green paper, a white paper, three draft bills, pre-legislative
scrutiny in Parliament, human rights audits by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and eventually a
decision to make only those amendments to the 1983 Act which were thought most necessary. It is not
entirely clear that either side has prevailed. 
Two examples will have to do. We now have a completely open-ended diagnostic criterion for compulsion
– any mental disorder – which removes any connection between the capacity of the patient to make
decisions for himself and the power of the state to authorise his detention. But we also have a requirement
that appropriate treatment actually be available for the patient before his liberty is taken away16. We also
have community treatment orders – so confusingly called SCT in the Codes of Practice – but considerable
limitations on the circumstances in which treatment can be imposed upon a community patient. 
So now the mental health law community has to grapple with two pieces of legislation, three Codes of
Practice, and a multitude of case law both in the UK and in Strasbourg. Oh, and with different Codes and
Regulations in England and Wales. Enormous care has been taken to keep the mental health and mental
capacity regimes separate. But why? Some might think that the principles underlying the mental capacity
regime were all one needed and the procedures in the mental health regime might be suitably adapted.
But that is probably too radical a thought. No wonder all the books are getting fatter.
But I continue to ask myself, what is all this law for? Is it to enable people with mental disorders to obtain
the care and treatment most suitable to their needs? Or is it to protect the rest of us from our fear of the
harm that a small minority of them may do? Or is it to keep them away from hospitals and doctors and
protect them from being treated differently from other people? I think that I might summarise the guiding
and unifying principles like this:
(1) People with mental disorders and disabilities should be enabled to receive the treatment and
care which they need. 
(2) This applies to all people, without discrimination on grounds such as sex, racial or ethnic origin,
sexual orientation, religion, membership of a particular social group, or the nature of their
disorder or disability.
(3) Enabling does not mean enforcing. Everyone should be assumed to have the ability to decide for
themselves whether to accept the treatment or care that others think they need. A person’s
right to choose what may be done with his body or his mind should only be taken away if he
lacks the capacity to make the decision for himself.
(4) Any restriction on this right should be kept to a minimum. If it is taken away in important
respects, for example by depriving him of liberty or obliging him to accept treatment which he
16 Other than in the case of short-term detentions (ss.5(4), 5(2), 135, 136), detentions for assessment (ss.4, 2) and remands by
the criminal courts for reports (s.35).
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does not want, there should be effective safeguards against abuse, regular reviews and the
opportunity to challenge the decision before an independent tribunal. 
(5) There must always be the appropriate care and treatment in return. The guiding principle in
deciding what to do should be the best interests of the patient, but his own personality, wishes,
feelings and values are an important part in deciding what will be best for him.
(6) Underlying and overriding all of these principles is respect for the dignity and humanity of all
people, however disabled or disordered in body or in mind or both. 
These are undoubtedly the values underlying the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and translated into law. They
are less obviously the values underlying or reflected in the Mental Health Act 2007. The amended section
118 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires the Code of Practice to say something similar, but reading the
Code always suggests a sting in the tail:
“1.2 Decisions under the Act must be taken with a view to minimising the undesirable effects of
mental disorder by maximising the safety and wellbeing of patients, promoting their recovery and
protecting other people from harm.” 
I think it improves with the next:
“1.3 People taking action without a patient’s consent must attempt to keep to a minimum the
restrictions they impose upon the patient’s liberty, having regard to the purpose for which the
restrictions are imposed.”
The next is better still:
“1.4 People taking decisions under the Act must recognise and respect the diverse needs, values
and circumstances of each patient . . . They must consider the patient’s views, wishes and feelings
(whether expressed at the time or in advance).” 
As is the next:
“1.5 Patients must be given the opportunity to be involved, as far as practicable in the
circumstances, in planning, developing and reviewing their own treatment and care to help ensure
that it is delivered in a way that is as appropriate and effective for them as possible ... Carers and
families should also be involved.”
But what about the last?
“1.6 People taking decisions under the Act must seek to use the resources available to them and
to patients in the most effective, efficient and equitable way, to meet the needs of patients and to
achieve the purpose for which the decision was taken.”
Which is more efficient? To invoke the DOLS where an elderly patient is in fact being prevented from
leaving the ward, to find ways of caring for her which avoid this risk, or to find ways of avoiding invoking
the DOLs? As we learn more about the new laws and how they are working in the course of today,
perhaps we could think about my radical suggestion!
